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ADMISSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL CASES OF
EVIDENCE OF OTHER SEX OFFENSES
Evidence that tends to prove the proposition for which it is intro-
duced is logically relevant.' Since trial is a means by which truth is
sought, all evidence that facilitates the task of the triers of fact in arriv-
ing at the truth is logically relevant.2 Nevertheless, some types of evi-
dence may be excluded when it is thought that the harm or injustice
that may result exceeds whatever probative value the evidence may
have.3 Such evidence is often said to be legally, as distinguished from
logically, irrelevant Evidence of other acts or offenses of a defendant
in a criminal case, when offered to prove the commission of the offense
charged, traditionally comes within this category.5
In a recent Arizona case, State v. Finley,G a criminal prosecution for
rape, the state offered evidence of another rape allegedly committed by
the defendant five days prior to the one of which he was accused. The
defendant's objection to admission of this evidence was overruled. On
appeal, the majority of the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. The court recognized the general rule that
"Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44 (19o4); James, Relevancy,
Probability and the Law, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 689 (1941).
'James points out that the decisive inquiry is whether there is an apparently
greater probability of the existence of the ultimate fact (the fact sought to be
proved) after the admission of the evidence than existed before. Id. at 699.
Therefore, the issue of relevancy is primarily one for the jury. The judge
should exclude evidence on the basis of its irrelevancy only if he feels that it is
so lacking in probative value as not to deserve the jury's consideration. 1 Wigmore,
Evidence § 29 (3d ed. 194o) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore].
'Id. at § 29(a).
"There is no constitutional right to introduce all evidence that may be logically
relevant upon an issue raised. Consideration of social policy and practical expedi-
ency long ago produced a number of rules excluding from consideration facts
which logically have some probative force." Commonwealth v. Di Stasio, 294 Mass.
273, 1 N.E.2d 189, 195 (1936).
"James, supra note 1; i Wigmore § 28(a).
"Legal relevancy requires a higher standard of evidentiary force.... The fact
that [evidence] is logically relevant does not insure admissibility; it must also be
legally relevant." Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1042 (1946).
GCapone v. United States, 51 F.2d 6o 9 , 619 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
669 (1931); Keene v. Commonwealth, 307 Ky. 308, 210 S.W.2d 926 (1948); Common-
wealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 116 A.2d 867 (1955); 1 Wharton, Criminal
Evidence § 232 (12th ed. 1955).
685 Ariz. 327, 338 P.2d 790 (1959).
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proof of another offense cannot be put in evidence to prove the crime
charged, but held that the evidence fell within a well recognized excep-
tion to this rule. The previous rape was found to be legally relevant
"to show a system, plan or scheme embracing two or more crimes," 7
the two occurrences showing the "same bent of mind and sinister de-
sign or practice."8 The rationale was that the prior acts of rape showed
the defendant's lustful propensity to commit such a crime.
The dissenting judge recognized that evidence of another offense is
admissible if it tends to establish a scheme or plan. But he felt that
the prior offense in this case, having occurred in another state some
500 miles distant,9 was not relevant to show such a scheme or plan.
The dissenting judge felt that the majority was disregarding a cardinal
rule of evidence by allowing the evidence to be introduced on the basis
of its relevance to show the bad character of the accused, although os-
tensibly basing its admissibility on its relevance to show a scheme or
plan.
The broad statement is frequently made that evidence of the com-
mission of one offense is irrelevant to prove the commission of an-
other.10 The fact that one has committed other offenses is of slight
probative value to show that he committed the offense charged." On
the other hand, the evidence may be extremely relevant to prove some
material element of the crime charged, such as motive, intent, absence
of mistake, scheme or plan, or identity.12 Then there is a double in-
1338 P.2d at 794-95.
8Id. at 795.
"The fact that the other offense occurred in another jurisdiction does not of itself
make the evidence inadmissible. However, remoteness in time or place will tend
to negative the relevancy of the evidence to show a common scheme or plan. Harris
v. State, 88 Okla. Crim. 422, 204 P.2d 3o5 (1949); State v. Buxton, 324 Mo. 78, 22
S.W.2d 635 (1929); Melville, Evidence as to Similar Offenses, Acts or Transactions in
Criminal Cases, 29 Dicta 235 (1952); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 638 (1940).
1 Railton v. United States, 127 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1942); People v. Cione, 293 Ill.
321, 127 N.E. 646 (1920); State v. Rand, 238 Iowa 250, 25 N.W.2d 8oo (1947); Sykes
v. State, 112 Tenn. 572, 82 S.W. 185 (19o4); I Wharton, op. cit. supra note 5, § 232.
See also, Annot., 17o A.L.R. 3o6 (1947).
21"[I]t cannot be argued: 'Because A did an act X last year, therefore he prob-
ably did the act X as now charged.' Human action being infinitely varied, there is
no adequate probative connection between the two." i Wigmore § 192.
A possible exception exists when two crimes are so inseparably intertwined
that they may each be considered part of the same act. In such a case, evidence
of one necessarily tends to prove the other-it is somewhat incorrectly said to be
part of the res gestae and is admissible. People v. Scheck, 356 Ill. 56, i9o N.E. io8
(1934); People v. Than, 219 N.Y. 39, 113 N.E. 556 (1916); Compton v. Commonwealth,
19o Va. 48, 55 S.E.2d 446 (1949); 1 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 5, § 234.
22People v. Zachowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (193o); 1 Wigmore § 215-217;
Hale, Some Comments on Character Evidence and Related Topics, 22 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 341, 345 (1949).
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ference. For example, when the accused is charged with killing A it
may be inferred from the fact that A witnessed a crime committed by
the accused that the accused had a motive for killing A, and from the
fact the accused had a motive, it may be inferred that he did kill A.13
In determining whether these inferences are valid, two questions of
relevance are presented: first, whether the evidence of the other offense
truly tends to establish some material element or factor, and secondly,
whether this element or basis of relevance-as in the example, motive-
has any probative value from which to infer that the accused committ-
ed the crime charged. 14
The basic question involved when considering the admissibility of
evidence of prior acts of misconduct is whether the accused's character
-i.e., his disposition to commit a crime like that charged-is a valid
intermediate basis of relevance upon which to allow the admission of
such evidence. While the character of the accused is always basically
relevant, 5 the prosecution in most jurisdictions is not permitted to
show the accused's bad character unless the defense has first produced
evidence of his good character.' 6
However, assuming that the character of the accused is relevant,
the question remains whether evidence of prior conduct or other offen-
ses is admissible to show character. The universal rule is that it is
not.17 The reason for the inadmissibility of such evidence is not that
it is logically irrelevant. On the contrary, it has always been recog-
nized that evidence of other offenses is extremely cogent to show the
character of the accused.' 8 The evidence is excluded because of rea-
"'i Wigmore § 192.
24Ibid.
151d. at § 55.
n"Railton V. United States, 127 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1942); People v. Goff, ioo Cal.
App. 2d x66, 223 P.2d 27 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); People v. Richardson, 222 N.Y. io3,
i8 N.E. 514 (1917); Jones v. Town of LaCrosse, 18o Va. 406, 23 S.E.2d 142 (1942).
The reason for this rule is similar to reasons for the inadmissibility of evidence
of other offenses or acts to prove character once it is in issue. See notes 19-2o infra
and accompanying text. "[T]he result would be that the man on his trial might be
overwhelmed by prejudice, instead of being convicted on that affirmative evidence
which the law of this country requires. The evidence is relevant to the issue, but
is excluded for reasons of policy and humanity." Regina v. Rowton, Le & Ca. 520,
540-541, 169 Eng. Rep. 1497, 1506 (1856).
17Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948); State v. Lapage, 57 N.H.
245 (1876); Day v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907, 86 S.E.2d 23 (1955); 1 Wharton, op.
cit. supra note 5. § 232.
18"I shall not.., deny this. [That evidence of a prior offense is logically rele-
vant to show a propensity to commit a similar offense.] If I know a man has broken
into my house ... I am ... more ready to believe him guilty of breaking into my
neighbor's house .... This is human nature-the teaching of human experience."
State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245, 3oo (1876).
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sons of collateral policy intended to prevent verdicts based on in-
sufficient evidence.' 9 These policy considerations are primarily two:
(i) the principle of undue prejudice-the recognition of the tendency
of juries to condemn on finding that the accused is of a character
likely to commit such an act or merely that he is a reprehensible
sort; 20 (2) the consideration of undue surprise-the basic injustice of
introducing evidence against one who is unprepared to offer evidence
of its untruth.
2'
Evidence of other offenses committed by the accused is always
admissible to prove any other material proposition to which it is
logically relevant other than the accused's propensity to commit the
crime.22 As is sometimes stated, the evidence is admissible if there is an
independent basis of relevance.23 These are limited only by the evi-
dentiary issues presented by the trial, the most common being capacity,
motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake, and design or plan.
24
The court in the Finley case based the admissibility of evidence of
a prior rape on its relevance to show a common scheme or plan em-
bracing the two crimes-a well recognized independent basis of rele-
vance.25 However, in reaching this conclusion, the court used language
that lends color to the contention in the dissent that the court was
actually basing its decision on the relevance of the evidence to show
the character of the accused. At one point in the decision the court
emphasized its belief that "the two occurrences were characterized
"i Wigmore § 194.
2nCommonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super, 328, 116 A.2d 867 (1955); State v.
Larsen, 42 Idaho 517, 246 Pac. 313 (1926); 1 Wigmore § 194.
ftCommonwealth v. Boulden, supra note 2o; Regina v. Rowton, Le. & Ca. 520,
541, 169 Eng. Rep. 1447, 15o6 (1865); 1 Wigmore § 174.
Besides the two suggested bases for the rule, Wigmore suggests a possible
third which is sometimes given by the courts, that of confusion of issues. However,
as he states, this consideration plays but a small part. Ibid.
"See note 12 supra.
"Lectures by Professor Charles V. Laughlin, Washington & Lee Law School Evi-
dence class, March 1959.
'AHeglin v. United States, 27 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1928) (intent); Davis v. State, 213
Ala. 541, 1o5 So. 677 (1925) (motive); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 669, 75
N.E.2d 241 (1947) (capacity) (dictum); State v. DePauw, 246 Minn. 91, 74 N.W.2d 297
(1955) (scheme or plan); State v. Harrison, 285 S.W. 83 (Mo. 1926) (identity).
These more common independent bases are frequency referred to as standard
exceptions to the rule denying admission of evidence of other offenses. This is a
misconception. Evidence of other acts or offenses is admissible if it is relevant
on any issue in the case. The single exception to the general rule of admissibility
is that it may not be used to show the character of the accused. This misconception
has caused a great deal of the confusion which abounds in this field. Hale, supra
note 12, at 345.
21 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 5, § 240; 1 Wigmore § 217.
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by the manifestation of the same bent of mind .... ,,26 At another
point, the court said that "the rationale underlying the admissibility
of evidence of prior acts of rape is partially for the purpose of showing
defendant's criminal desires and lustful propensity to commit such a
crime."27
Even if it were admitted that evidence of the prior rape shows
a common scheme or plan, the trial court's instruction went further
and allowed the jury to consider the prior rape as bearing on the de-
fendant's bad character. The trial court instructed that the evidence
of the other offense was admitted "to prove his [defendant's] lustful
and lascivious disposition and as having a tendency to render it more
probable that the acts ... charged... -were committed"28 by the ac-
cused. The failure to reverse, when considered in the light of these
instructions, strongly supports a view that the majority was proceed-
ing on the basis that evidence of other acts of misconduct is admissible
to prove the bad character of the accused.
Modern American courts tend to admit evidence of similar of-
fenses more freely when the accused is charged with a sex offense than
with other crimes,29 generally straining to find a recognized indepen-
dent basis of relevance.30 As in the principal case, the most common
bases used are intent and scheme or plan.31 In at least two jurisdic-
tions the courts candidly state that evidence of other similar offenses is
allowed for the purpose of showing the disposition of the accused
3 2
to commit a sex crime like the one charged. Justification for the relax-
ation of a long standing exclusionary rule is frequently dismissed with
a statement that in this area of the law evidence of similar offenses
'338 P.2d at 795. (Emphasis added.)
-"Ibid.
2338 P.2d at 796. (Emphasis added.)
"Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 694 (1956); 9 Wash. 9. Lee L. Rev. 86 (1952); see
also Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super 328, 116 A.2d 867 (1955); Annot.,
167 A.L.R. 565 (1941).
33Johnson v. State, 242 Ala. 278, 5 So. 2d 632 (1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 693
(1942); People v. Westek, 31 Cal. 2d 469, 190 P.2d 9 (1948); Barkley v. State, 19o Ga.
641, io S.E.2d 32 (194o); State v. DePauw, 246 Minn. 91, 74 N.W.2d 297 (1955); Com-
monwealth v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 65 A.2d 348 (1949).
"The intent basis is used, by the courts irrespective of the fact that with most
sex offenses intent may be inferred from the act. See Gerlach v. State, 217 Ark. 102,
229 S.W.2d 37 (1950)-
The admission of evidence of another offense in order to show a scheme or
plan would appear quite attenuated when it was admitted to "infer" a design or
plan from two unrelated acts. See Commonwealth v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 65 A.2d
348 (1949).
"People v. Herman, 97 Cal. App. 2d 272, 217 P.2d 44o (Dist. Ct. App. 195o); State
v. Whiting, 173 Kan. 711, 252 P.2d 884 (1953).
88 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVII
is relevant to show the character of the accused.33 This reasoning seems
to indicate a misunderstanding of the original basis for the rule limit-
ing the admissibility of evidence of other acts or offenses. It has never
been claimed that such evidence is not logically relevant to show
the accused's propensity to commit the crime charged. The exclusion-
ary rule is based on considerations of collateral policy.34 These policy
considerations, particularly that of undue prejudice, seem to require
even greater precautions for sex offenses than for other crimes.3 5
Actually, the rationale behind the relaxation of the rules of ad-
missibility in the field of sex crimes is the belief that there is a greater
tendency on the part of the sex offender than the ordinary offender to
repeat his crime.36 And therefore the probative value of such evidence
is thought to outweigh any policy considerations that would point to
its exclusion.37 The validity of this assumption, that sex offenders
are more susceptible than other criminals to recidivism is open to
question. There is some difference of opinion among the sociologists
and criminologists who have studied the problem; but the majority
seem of the opinion that recidivism is considerably less among sex
offenders than among other types of criminals.38
Strong arguments have been made that evidence of other acts or
offenses of an accused should always be admissible in any case to
prove his character.3 9 Such a contention is certainly not totally without
merit. There is, however, no substantial basis for applying a dif-
ferent rule for sex crimes than for other types of criminal offenses.4 0
MANLEY P. CALDWELL, JR.
"sState v. Clough, 33 Del. 140, 132 Ad. 219 (1925); State v. Scheuller, 120 Minn.
26, 138 N.W. 937 (1912); Woodruff v. State, 72 Neb. 815, 1O1 N.W. 1114 (1904).
"4See note ig supra.
"-Note, 37 Minn. L. Rev.. 608, 614 (1953).
"I have no doubt that but for the abhorrence and deep-rooted contempt with
which all sex crimes are viewed this additional exception to the general rule would
never have found its way into the jurisprudence of the courts of the land." State v.
Terrand, 21o La. 394, 27 So. 2d 174, 179 (1946) (disssent).
339 Calif. L. Rev. 584, 587 (1951); Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 694, 7o1 (1951); see
Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 116 A.2d 867, 873-74 (1955).
=Ibid.
"'Barnes & Teeters, New Horizons in Criminology 102-07 (2d ed. 1951); Best,
Crime and the Criminal Law in the United States 283-84 (1930); Commonwealth
v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 1n6 A.2d, 867, 873 n.2 (1955). But see McDonald,
Psychiatry and the Criminal 150 (1958). It has been argued that even if there is a
greater propensity on the part of the sex criminal to repeat his crime, it is not
sufficiently great or conclusive as to justify the change of a well established exclu-
sionary rule. Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 694, 702 (1956).
"Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 988
(1938).
"The courts of many states have relaxed the rules of admissibility of evidence
of other acts of misconduct only when the offense charged is a so-called consensual
